Chartered Trust plc v Pitcher
Queen's Bench Division 12 February 1987 (Times Law Report 13.2.87)

Where a finance company re-possessed under a hire purchase agreement goods protected under section 33(1) of the Hire Purchase Act 1965 otherwise than by action, that constituted a contravention of section 34(1) if the hirer had not given an unqualified and informed consent to re-possession. But such recovery would be permissible if it did not amount to "enforcing any right" within the section.

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by Chartered Trust plc from an order of a County Court judge, whereby the judge dismissed a claim for £2,451 made by the company against Mr R. J. Pitcher. This was the balance due from Mr Pitcher under a hire purchase agreement dated October 10, 1982, in respect of a Ford Granada car.

Section 33(1) of the 1965 Act defined "protected goods" as goods let under a hire purchase agreement of which one third of the hire purchase price had been paid and when the hirer had not terminated the agreement.

It was held that it was clear that if there was unqualified and informed consent by Mr Pitcher to the collection of the car by Chartered Trust, then there could be no question of a breach of section 34(1).

The section was penal in its consequences and it was obviously impossible to conclude that if a finance company recovered possession with the unqualified and informed consent of the hirer it was "enforcing a right", that is, a right conferred by the hirer's consent. The issue turned on the effect of the word "enforce". That implied action which was not consensual, but to some extent coercive.

The judge held that the recovery of the car was not consensual because Mr Pitcher's consent to it was not "informed consent". On the facts, the circumstances in which possession of the car was recovered by Chartered Trust showed that its recovery was not on a merely consensual basis so far as Mr Pitcher was concerned. The recovery which was made was sufficiently coercive to amount to an enforcement of a right otherwise than by action and that contravened section 34(1). It was never Mr Pitcher's wish that Chartered Trust should simply take the car back. He did not intend to exercise the option to terminate the agreement. What he really wanted was to keep the car on the basis of some re-arrangement of this financial obligations.

The court had power to make an order to that effect under section 35 although Mr Pitcher did not know that.